Probabilistic Semantics and Defaults by Neufeld, Eric & Poole, David L
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Probabilistic Semantics and Defaults 
Eric Neufeld and David Poole 
Department of Computer Science 
University of Waterloo 
Waterloo, CANADA, N2L 3Gl 
Abstract 
There is much interest in providing proba-· 
bilistic semantics for defaults but most ap­
proaches seem to suffer from one of two prob­
lems: either they require numbers, a problem 
defaults were intended to avoid, or they gen­
erate peculiar side effects. 
Rather than provide semantics to defaults, 
we address the original problem that defaults 
were intended to solve: that of reasoning un­
der uncertainty where numeric probability 
distributions are not available. We describe 
a non-numeric formalism called an inference 
graph based on standard probability theory, 
conditional independence and sentences of 
confirmation, where a confirms b = coni( a, b) 
= p(a!b) > p(a). 
The formalism seems to handle the exam­
ples from the nonmonotonic literature. Most 
importantly, the sentences of our system can 
be verified by performing an appropriate ex­
periment in the semantic domain. 
1 Introduction 
should not be thought of as having any mean­
ing in. the sense of "most" or "typical"; they 
are statements the user is prepared to accept 
as part of an explanation as to why some­
thing may be true. 
What, then, does a default mean? Within 
the default logic camp, we know of no work 
which provides a semantics for defaults, in 
the sense that an experiment is described 
that can be performed in the semantic do­
main to verify the truth of a default. It is 
therefore compelling to view defaults as qual­
itative probabilistic statements where nu­
meric distributions are unavailable. We sur­
vey some of these views but note most re­
quire numbers, something default reasoning 
intended to avoid, or have side effects. 
Rather than "add semantics" to defaults, 
we construct a sound non-numeric proba­
bilistic formalism called an inference graph. 
We explore its mathematical properties, then 
apply it to the standard examples. We con­
clude with a brief description of the imple­
mentation. 
Though default r�asoning involves reason- 2 What's in a default? 
ing under conditions of uncertainty, some 
argue it is not probabilistic reasoning. Re- Poole et al [20] attempt to put both default 
iter and Crisculo [21] distinguish the two by reasoning and diagnosis under a single urn­
suggesting different interpretations for the brella by constructing a system containing a 
word "most" . Probabilistic reasoning gives set of facts F known to be true, a set � of 
"most" a statistical connotation, whereas de- defaults, and g, a set of (possible) observa­
fault logic gives it a prototypical sense. On tions which are goals to be proved. Here we 
the other hand, Poole (18] claims defaults assume F, �and g are propositional. 
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· . .; 
If D is a subset of � such that 
F U D I= g, and F U D is consistent. 
then D is an ezplanation of g. This system is 
based on a theorem prover and can be used 
in two ways. If g consists of observations 
known to be true, we interpret g as querying 
t»hy g?, and Dis a diagnosis of g. If g is not 
known to be true, then g is interpreted as 
querying t»hether g?, and g is a prediction of 
FUD. The problem default logic runs into is 
that there _is typically another D' such that 
FuD' predicts -.g; this is known as the mul­
tiple eztension problem and is discussed be­
low. (This is a very abbreviated presentation 
of default reasoning; for details on implemen­
tation and application see [15,14).) 
AJJ pointed out in the introduction, de­
faults appear to have no semantics, and 
many researchers study the relationship be­
tween default reasoning and uncertainty. 
Rich [22) advocates adding certainty factors 
to possible hypotheses to fine-tune a default 
reasoning syst�m and concludes "default rea­
soning is likelihood reasoning and treating it 
that way simplifies it" . While some argue 
with her treatment, her conclusions seem to 
be widely held. Ginsberg [4] pursues this ap­
proach. 
At the 1987 Workshop on Uncertainty in 
AI, Groaof suggested defaults are interval­
valued probabilities on the entire unit inter­
val. Default inference thus becomes closely 
related to Kyburg's theory of interval-valued 
probabilities [8, 7). 
In · [9]; McCarthy states non-monotonic 
sentences can represent statements of in­
finitesimal probability, but does not go into 
detail. Pearl explores this in [12]. This inter­
pretation has some problems. Let e = emu, 
b -:- bird, I = fly. If 
p(flb) � 1, p(fle) � O,p(ble) � 1 
(i.e., there are some non-bird emus) then 
from 
p(fle)_· p(flbe)p(ble) + p(fl-.be)p(-.ble) 
Pearl shows p(flbe) � 0. Then, from 
p(flb) = p(fleb)P(elb) + p(ll-.eb)p(-.elb) 
it follows p(elb) � 0. But since a prior is 
always bounded by its conditionals on any 
evidence and the negation of that evidence, 
we can show p(e) � 0. 
Default logic also has this "property": 
from no knowledge at all, we can prove -.emu 
by cases from fly and -.fly using the contra­
positive forms C?f the defaults. This intro­
duces the following variant of the "lottery 
paradox" (8]. 
Example 2.1 Suppose kangaroos (k) are 
exceptional because they have a marsupial 
birth and platypusses (p) are exceptional be­
cause they lay eggs but dingos (d) have no 
such exceptional traits. If 
ozzie-animal => e V k V p V d, 
then p( dl ozzie-animal) is close to one since 
the disjunction of the other three is close to 
zero. Default reasoning and circumscription 
(16] suffer the same problem. Poole [17,3] 
solves this by explicitly pruning the proof 
tree with a set of sentences called constraints. 
However, to do this, you need to know the 
right answers in advance. 
Besides making subclasses vanish, Pearl's 
£-semantics suffers another problem: in gen­
eral, it is impossible to go out into a real 
problem domain and find a set of conditional 
probabilities infinitely close to one. 
Bacchus[1] addresses this issue of practi­
cality and argues for thresholding, that is, 
that a possible hypothesis stands for a prob­
ability greater than some threshold k > 1/2. 
His system allows only a single defeasible in­
ference, since p(bla) > k and p(clb) > k do 
not in general constrain the value of p( cia) 
to be greater thank. 
There seems to be no end to different prob­
abilistic semantics that might be added to 
defaults or inference rules that might be in­
vented to come up with the right answers for 
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the various examples. We claim it is neces­
sary to ask again what were the original goals 
of formalisms such as default reasoning, in­
heritance hierarchies and semantic nets. We 
should reconsider the original objections to 
standard probability, and ask whether we 
solve the problem in a principled way, with­
out tlie invention of new formalisms. 
3 Inference graphs 
An inference graph is a strictly probabilis­
tic formalism based on standard probabil­
ity theory, conditional independence and sen­
tences of confirmation. Rather than give 
rules for accepting uncertain conclusions, the 
inference graph allows us to make inferences 
about shifts in belief. 
3.1 Confirmation 
An interesting mathematical property of log­
ical implication is that knowledge of the con­
sequent increases belief in the antecedent. 
That is, a =* b implies that p(ajb) ;:::. p(a). 
Rosenkrantz (23) calls this property confir­
mation, and we will see it has many of 
the same useful computational properties as 
other probabilistic formalisms. 
Confirmation describes a shift in belief; it 
seems to be the weakest probabilistic prop­
erty a default ought to have. This provides an 
interesting venue to explore: rather than use 
knowledge of the form "birds are more likely 
to fly than not" , we consider knowledge of 
the form "an individual is more likely to fly 
once we learn that it is a bird" . 
Consider Nutter's example (10], where in 
springtime it is not true that most birds fly, 
since most birds are flightless nestlings. Yet, 
the information that an individual is a bird 
inclines us to shift belief in favour of flying. 
This also admits an interesting kind of sen­
tence. If we say "Irish Canadians have red 
hair" , we do not mean mor� than half or al­
most all Irish Canadians have red hair, even 
though the stereotype is widely held. 
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3.2 Syntax 
An inference graph contains four kinds of 
links, =*, -, :;¢- and -f+. Links with double 
arrows are called logical links and the others 
are probabilistic links. Each node is labelled 
with a name or set of names in lower case ' 
for example, quaker or pacifist. Links are at-
tached to a name or its negation at either 
endpoint. 
3.3 Semantics 
Nodes in an inference graph denote events. 
Generally events have two mutually exclu­
sive outcomes, for example fly or --.fly. Occa­
sionally an event may have several mutually 
exclusive outcomes, (not all of which need be 
specified), for example {hawk, dove}. 
Sentences about confirmation1 are repre­
sented by the four kinds of links in an infer­
ence graph: 
a- b means p(bja) > p(b). 
a=* b means 1 = p(bla) > p(b). 
a -f+ b means p(-.b!a) > p(-.b). 
a:;¢- b means 1 = p(-.b!a) > p(-.b). 
(Note that we insist on strict inequality. 
This means that links such as 2 + 2 = 3 =* 
sky-is-blue cannot appear on an inference 
graph. For the same reason, we also insist 
all events are possible.) 
The topology of the inference graph carries 
information about independence of events. 
Definition 3.1 If p(a!b) = (a), a and b are 
unconditionally independent. 
Definition 3.2 If p(a!bc) = p(a!b), a is con­
ditionally independent of c, given b .  
1Poaaibly confirmation i s  too strong a term where 
logical implication is not involved. We use confir­
mation here in the sense of partial confirmation,_ or 
relevance. 
If a is a node, and b1, ... , bn are the nodes 
directed into a, then a is conditionally inde­
pendent of all the predecessors of the b, given 
the outcomes of the bi. 
Thus, an inference graph may be seen as a 
non-numeric influence diagram[25]. We next 
explore the kinds of inferences about confir­
mation that we can make. 
4 The confirmation relation 
Definition 4..1 If p(ajb) > p(a), we also 
write conf{a,b). 
4.1 Symmetry 
Lemma 4..2 If coni( a, b), then conj(b, a). 
Proof: Follows immediately from Bayes' 
Rule. 0 
This allows our system to be reversible; if 
we observe sneeze we can confirm has-cold. 
Alternately, if we know that someone has a 
cold we can predict they will sneeze. Thus 
we can use the same. formalism for prediction 
and diagnosis. 
4.2 Negation 
into difficulties when they apply the contra­
positive: they viola.te independence assump­
tions. 
4.3 Logical Inferences 
Lemma 4..4. If coni( a, c) and conj(b, d) 
where c and d are outcomes of the same ran­
dom variable, and a f= b, then conf{c,ab). 
Proof: p(cjab) = p(cja) > p(c), since sen­
tences of probability hold for logically equiv­
alent propositions. 0 
Default reasoners produce separate argu­
ments for c and d and attempt to choose 
among the arguments by appeal to "speci­
ficity" . Poole [19] calls it preferring the most 
specific theory and Kirby [6] calls it choosing 
the most specific extension. 
While the default logic view seems to be 
to prefer the conclusion based on the most 
specific knowledge, we remark that there is 
not universal agreement on this in the prob­
abilist community when statistics are not 
good. Kyburg [7,8] suggests we make an 
inference based on the narrowest reference 
class for which we have adequate statistics. 
Some Bayesians suggest that data from var­
ious subclasses be combined[2]2• 
Lemma 4..3 If coni( a, b), then coni( -.a, -.b). Lemma 4..S If b f= a, but a � b then 
Proof: By definition, p(ajb) > p(a). Negat­
ing both sides yields p(-.ajb) < p(-.a). Then 
p(bj-.a) < p(b) by Lemma 4.2 and negating 
again yields p(-.bl..:.,a) > p(-.b). Another ap­
plication of Lemma 4.2 yields the desired re­
sult. 0 
Thus, not only does bird increase belief in 
fly, -.bird increases belief in -.fly. An inter­
esting intermediate result is that the "contra­
positive" form of a link yields a valid infer­
ence, so long as it is made from a single link. 
This means use of the contrapositive form of 
a link is valid, bu.t the context of such an 
inference must be carefully restricted. Infer­
ence graphs also explain why default reason­
ers based on a theorem prover sometime run 
278 
conf(b,a). 
Proof: This generalizes the property of 
logical links to the rest of the graph. 0 
4.4 Transitive inference 
Default proofs consist of more than a single 
inference; part of the appeal of such reason­
ers is that they appear to create and argu­
ment by making inferences towards a goal. In 
general, if a - b and b - c are links on an in­
ference graph, we cannot conclude conj(c, a). 
However, if c is conditionally independent of 
a given b, it can be shown that conj(c, a). In 
2Thia reference was pointed out to us by Peter 
Cheeseman. 
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fact, conditional independence gives us much 
more than transitivity. Not only can we re­
verse the inference, we can perform transduc­
tion, inferring evidence from other evidence. 
We can also confirm certain conjunctions. 
Lemma 4.6 (Probabilistic Resolution} If 
there exists c such conf(a,c) and conf(b,c) 
and a is conditionally independent of b given 
c, then conf(a,b). 
Proof: By contradiction. Suppose p(alb) � 
Proof: p(albc) = p(alc) > p(a), from the 
definition of conditional independence. 0 
Lemma 4.9 (Relevance) Suppose conf(a,c) 
and conf(b,c} and a is conditionally indepen­
dent of b given c. Then conf(ab,c). 
Proof: conf(a,b) follows from Lemma 4.6, 
and p(alb) < p(a, c) from Lemma 4.7. Then 
p(ablc) = p(alc)p(blc) < p(alb)p(b). 0 
Other inferences p(a). From the premises and an identity of 4.5 
probability it follows p(alb) � p(al-.,b). Then, 
The following two lemmas address situations 
p(alb) = p(alcb)p(clb) + p(al-.,cb)p(-.,clb). that prove to be useful in Section 5.3. The 
( I ) ( I b) ( I b) ( I b) ( I b) proofs are straightforward and we omit them. p a -.,b = p a c..., p c ...., +p a -,c..., p ...,c ...., • 
Simplify using the conditional independence LeiDDla 4.10 If coni( ...,a, b), coni( a, c), and 
knowledge, then subtract to obtain b � c, then coni( a, -,be). 
0 � p(al-.,b)- p(alb) 
- (p(alc)- p(al...,c))(p(cl-.,b)- p(clb)). 
But then both terms must be positive, con­
tradicting the premise that conj(b, c). 0 
Unsurprisingly, each such inference results 
in a dilution of confirmation. This lemma is 
needed for later results. 
Lemma 4.11 If r and e are the direct pre­
decessors of g, and 
1. r I= e, 
2. a I= e, 
3. r is unconditionally independent 
of a, 
4. conj(g, e), 
5. conj(-.g, r) , 
Lemma 4.7 If conf{a,b} and conf{b,c) and 
a is conditionally independent of c given b, then conf(g, a). 
then p(alc) < p(alb). 
Proof: 
p(alc) = p(albc)p(blc) + p(al-.,bc)p(-.,blc) 
= p(alb)p(blc) + p(al-.,b)p(-.,blc) 
< p(alb)p(blc) + p(alb)p(-.,blc) 
- p(alb)(p(blc) + p(-.,blc)) 
= p(alb)o 
The next two lemmas yield two ways of 
confirming conjunctions of events. 
Lemma 4.8 (Irrelevance) If conf(a,c) and 
a is conditionally independent of b given c, 
then conf(a,bc). 
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5 Examples 
5.1 Birds fly 
This inference graph aims to capture a lot 
of information. If something is a bird, we 
believe it is more likely that it will fly, and 
if it flies, it is more likely to be airborn. If 
something is an emu, we are less likely to 
believe it flies, but if it is a flemu (flying emu) 
we again change our belief. We are inclined 
to believe that birds have feathers. What 
inferences can we make from this graph? 
Birds fty, emus don't We can prove 
conj(fty, bird) and coni{ -.fly, emu) from the 
single links containing this information. 
More importantly, we cannot prove 
conf(fly,emu}, i.e., we do not have the "mul­
tiple extension" problem. We can use 
Lemma 4.4 to conclude coni{ -.fly, bird/\ emu). 
Emus don't vanish Exactly the opposite 
is true: we show coni{ emu, bird). Note that 
we do not accept conclusions, just increase 
our belief in them. 
Emus are not airborn In default reason­
ers based on theorem provers, there is typi­
cally a single proof of airbom from emu using 
the default "birds fly". Poole (13] solves this 
by accepting only what is true in every ex­
tension. The semantics of extensions are not 
very well understood; it is trivial to gener­
ate probability distributions where proposi­
tions true in every extension are less likely 
than those that are. not. Thus the meaning 
of this conclusion is unclear, We conclude an 
individual is less likely to be airborn given it 
is an emu because coni( -.airbom, -.fly) and 
coni( emu, -.fly) and airbom is conditionally 
independent of emu given fly. 
Feathered things fty With Lemma 4.6, 
we can show conj{feathers, fly) using c = bird. 
5.2 Modified Nixon Diamond 
Below is the historic example of not want­
ing to draw an inference. H Dick is both a 
Quaker and a Republican, we do not want to 
conclude he is a hawk or dove. 
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Our system concludes that quaker in­
creases belief in dove and republican increases 
belief in hawk. Since the graph contains no 
information· about the joint distribution, we 
do not conclude either hawk or dove if Nixon 
is both. 
However, we want to conclude Quak­
ers and Republicans are political. In­
heritance systems cannot represent mutual 
exelusion(S]. Default reasoners simply add 
all the links with the result that political is 
.true given dove or -.dove[13]. It is possible 
to prove that an object about which nothing 
is known is a political non-emu! 
We solve the problem in this formalism 
by making hawk and dove mutually exclu­
sive but not necessarily exhaustive outcomes 
of some random event. Since political is 
conditionally independent of quaker given 
dove, we can make the desired inference using 
Lemma 4.6. The price we pay for consistency 
and transitive inference is not being able to 
show that -.hawk is confirmed by quaker. H 
we allow this, then we can confirm both po­
litical and its negation given quaker. 
5.3 Royal and African Elephants 
This appears in [24,5]. Intuitively, the graph 
is suppose to show elephants are typically 
gray, but Royal elephants are not. H Clyde is 
both and African and a Royal elephant what 
are we to conclude about grayness? 
We use Lemma 4.11 to conclude African 
elephants are gray. If royal is true, then ele­
phant is true and the conditional indepen­
dence assumptions shield gray from the effect 
of african and we conclude conf(-.gray,{royal 
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african]). This would not be true if the links 
from royal and african to elephant were prob­
abilistic. 
Horty et al and Sandewall disagree on this. 
We claim there are no "right" answers to 
this question and we build different graphs 
to model domains with different properties. 
5.4. Naive diagnosis 
Consider the diagnostic dual to the "birds 
fly" problem. 
If we observe sneeze, a default reasoner 
produces all three diseases as diagnoses. The 
inference graph confirms both flu and w-flu; 
of these it is easy to prefer the most probable 
diagnosis confirmed by the observations. · If 
we observe -,sneeze only o-ftu is confirmed. 
6 Conclusions 
We applied the formalism to many other 
default inference problems including plan 
recognition and stereotyping with positive 
results. In general, we obtain answers that 
agree with intuition. Where we haven't, the 
underlying sound probabilistic basis has al­
ways provided the tool for understanding the 
structure of the particular problem. 
We have implemented the system in Pro­
log. A set of input probabilistic and log­
ical arcs are compiled into a graph that 
is used specifically for testing conditional 
independence using Pearl's definition of d­
separability[ll]. The rest of the system con-
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sists of a straightforward transcription of the 
Lemmas in Section 4 into Prolog and the sys­
tem prints a readable proof of the probabilis­
tic inferences it makes. 
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